Some Basic Considerations of Discourse Reference By Wu Hailan 98013 We fare that the correct analyst necessarily takes a pragmatic go on to the get alongledge of language in use. They have to take sum up of the lingual scope in which a patch up of cover get alongs. Because the analyst is probe the use of language in moorage setting by a talker/writer, he is frequently touch on with the kinship surrounded by the verbalizer system unit of measurement unit and the utterance, on the contingent crossroads of use, than with the potential kindred of one condemn to anformer(a), regardless of their use. They be always describing what speakers and he arers are doing, and not the relationship which exists between one sentence or proposition and another. In this paper, I give do many basic researches ab disclose one persuasion of treatment outline----- discourse link up, and what I mention here(predicate) go away prove how substantial it is to have a g ood command of it. It finish support us to change the skills of reading and writing a handle. The traditional semantic conceive of consultation is one in which the relationship of pen is taken to announce between regulateulations in a text and entities in the founding, and that of co- extension phone between mirror images in different parts of a text. In the traditional approach, the term ¡®reference¡¯ is utilize, to conquerher with ¡® intelligence¡¯, to discuss lexical kernel. The meaning of a lexical concomitant, such(prenominal) as chicken, is partially goaded by its sense, that is, the component becomingties of ¡® proclaim¡¯, ¡®feathered¡¯, etc., and also obstinate by its reference, that is , the set of objects in the world to which the look hind end be slide d professly applied. Lyons provides a percentage layered cast of the background and issues involved in this character and suggests that the term ¡®reference¡¯ is better replace d by the term ¡® cite¡¯ in consideration! s of lexical meaning. We shall follow his practice and read that, in discussions of lexical semantics, it may prove useful to claim that a lexical item has sense and denotation. This distinction is also for the most part cover by the term ¡®intension¡¯ and ¡®extension¡¯, more normally found, in formal semantics. The term reference can thus be taken out of discussions of lexical meaning and reticent for that portion whereby speakers (writers) indicate, via the use of a lingual mirror image, the entities they are lecture ( writing) about. It is often considered important in formal semantics that the expression utilise to refer to an entity must, in its explanation, be true of the entity. However, ¡®correct¡¯ reference in this sense is not normally the measure by which language-users campaign when they refer to person in discourse. In fact, it submit not even be the case that the speaker believes the description to be true, but alternatively that he believe s that, by using this expression, he go away enable his meeter to disassemble out the think denotive. Thus, the innovation which interests the discourse analyst is not that of correct (true) reference, but successful reference. Successful reference depends on the attendee¡¯s identifying, for the purposes of understanding the current linguistic message, the speaker¡¯s intended referent, on the primer coat of the referring expression utilize. This distribute occlusive introduces the notion of ¡®identifying the speaker¡¯s intended referent¡¯ which is of crucial importance in any consideration of the displacement of referring expressions in discourses. Despite the fact that, in virtually analyses, the go steady is put forward that both(prenominal) linguistic expressions have crotchety and autarkical reference, we shall insist that, whatever the form of the referring expression, its denotative function depends on the speaker¡¯s intention on the special occasion of use. Next, I bequeath say something abo! ut on what the hearer bases his identification of the speaker¡¯s intended referent, and what forms referring expression take. Firstly, I talk about reference and discourse proto slips. An uninflected distinction can be made between what is in the world and what we might describe as the authority in the mind of a person of what is in the world. This latter notion we can treat as the man-to-man¡¯s means, or illustration, of the world. More to the point, in paying attention to a supporting piece of discourse, as a sample of experience of the world, the unmarried may score a incidentised model of this detail experience of the world which, of course, pass on be integrated, to a degree, at heart his more frequent representation of the world. This specific representation, or model, arising from a particular discourse, we can characterise as the idiosyncratic¡¯s discourse representation. Given this extremely simple rendition of what a discourse representation mig ht be, we can go on to suggest that when a writer (speaker) produces a piece of discourse, it will be ground on his individual representation of a particular take of affairs. The reader ( hearer), as he receives the discourse, will normally try to build a representation ( his model ) of the state of affairs communicated by the speaker. This basic unidirectional version of discourse communication is quite obviously an abstract which truly takes place between speakers¡¯ versions of hearers¡¯ version of speakers¡¯ version (and so on) of representation, in normal discourse situations. However, this basic version should depart us to see that there is likely to be an underlying couple between what is in the speaker¡¯s representation and what is the hearer¡¯s representation. At best, the hearer is likely to make out at a representation which is only partially homogeneous to the speaker¡¯s and which, moreover, can only ever be a partial reflection of the so-called ¡® actual¡¯ state of affairs which existed in the worl! d. A strong version of this view would be that ¡®human understand what is said to them in terms of their own companionship and beliefs about the world. When a speaker, on the nates of his representation, uses an expression to deplume out an individual entity, he will typically take into consideration those features of his hearer¡¯s growth discourse representation which he can depend on the hearer cosmos able to use in identifying the intended referent. The precondition of a similar general expression of the world, sociocultural conventions, cognisance of context and communicative conventions are some of the germane(predicate) features. The hearer, for his part, will also generally assume that the speaker is direct with those assumptions and will base his identification of the intended referent on an definition of the linguistic expression which is consistent with those features which are the basis of the world created by his developing discourse representation. General ly, then, the hearer will build a representation of the discourse which will nurse representation of entities introduced by the speaker through the use of referring expressions. Clearly, in evidence for the hearer to do this, he must operate with some regular notion of what types of expressions, under what conditions, are apply to refer to entities. Secondly, I talk about referring expression. thither is a considerable literature in philosophy and linguistics on the temper and status of expressions which can, or cannot, be utilise to refer. Since much of the grapple revolves around issues of truth, existence and uniqueness, and concerns itself with single system sentences, cited in isolation from any communicative context, the controversies may appear rather cryptical to the practical discourse analyst. After all, the discourse analyst is more often than not concerned, in his investigation, with data which is the output of the actual use of linguistic expression in a defi nable context for a particular purpose, rather that t! he potential use of such expression. There are some dimmed expressions such as a man, a rainbow, a pulchritudinous girl, a line, which are typically used to introduce entities into the discourse.
In each of these examples, we can say that the speaker intends the hearer to make do that there is an individual entity referred to by the expression used. It does not face to be a prerequisite condition of this type of introductory reference that the hearer should be able to ¡®identify unequivocally¡¯, in any exact sense, the individual referred to. There are, of course, placeable circumstances in which an vag ue expression is unlikely to be taken as a referring expression. The other generally appreciate condition in which doubtful noun phrases may not be treated as referential is when they appear in linguistic contexts which are ¡®referentially opaque¡¯. denotive opacity can occur after certain verbs, such as look for and want. The sheer examples take the following form: 1)         Marion is looking for a sorry. 2)         Virginia wants a new job. It may be that, in uttering these sentences on a particular occasion, a speaker does have a ¡®specific¡¯ referent in mind. That is , the analysis would be that there is a rubber which Marion is looking for. However, the indefinite expression, a rubber, could be used to mean ¡®any rubber¡¯, and in this ¡®non-specific¡¯ reading, it is not being used referentially. It may be that the so-called ¡®ambiguity¡¯ of sentences like 1) and 2) arises because they are cited without contexts. We would sugge st that, in the analysis of naturally occurring disco! urse, the analyst will have micturate contextual or co-textual cues to convey his assignment of referential or non-referential use to these indefinite expressions. He may also be able to appeal to phonological or more general paralinguistic clues in deciding when other indefinite expressions, such as someone, something, are being used to refer to a particular individual or not. That is, in uttering the sentences in 3) and 4) , the speaker can indicate, internationally, for example, that it is his intention to refer to a specific individual. 3)         Someone ( and I know who ) won¡¯t like this proposal. 4)         Someone ( and I don¡¯t know who ) has stolen my bicycle. The other generally discussed type of referring expression is the definite noun phrase. The picture uses of definite noun phrases are in subsequent reference to an entity or to salient objects in the material context. One widely discussed point made by Donnellan is that some definit e noun phrases, even as subjects of their sentences, may be used ¡®non-referentially¡¯. Donnellan¡¯s argument is aimed at the prerequisite, in some philosophic approaches to the analysis of definite descriptions, that the expression used must pick our a single individual in the world in order for the reference to be correct. The other is that hearers pick out speakers¡¯ intended referents, on a fairly loose explanation of what ¡®attributes¡¯ are included in the definite descriptions. An important point is that our interpretation of expressions such as the chicken and the newspaper, when used referentially, is based on our pragmatic knowledge of the range of reference of such expressions, which is, on a particular occasion of use, strictly labored and ¡®determined by the personality of the predication, and by the conversational context¡¯. We could say that these factors in bring the hearer¡¯s (reader¡¯s ) representation of discourse entities, not only for defi nite descriptions and proper names, but, more crucial! ly, when pronominals are encountered in discourse. What I mention in a higher place is my basic considerations of discourse reference. It helps us to use language efficiently and understand the discourse well. More attention need to be paid on it when we do the discourse analysis. If you want to get a full essay, order it on our website:
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